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Abstract.
In this paper, we study encryption in networks with the notion of Grothendieck
site. We use global objects defined in geometry to characterize data conveyed
in a network. This approach can be used to define efficiently keys for public
encryption.
0. Introduction.
A network is a set N such that for each elements u, v of N , there exists
a set Hom(u, v) called the set of connections between u and v. In practice,
the set N can be a set of peoples, and Hom(u, v), the communications tools
used by u and v to exchange data. Remark that we do not assume that N is
a category, that is the Chasles relation is not verified by the elements of the
sets Hom(u, v). The network that we are going to consider here is a network
whose users are computers, and the routes between two users u and v are wires
or wireless communication between u and v. The duality principle (The Ying-
Yang principle) shows that the existence of a network N implies the existence
of a different network N ′ (this is equivalent to the fact that the set of elements
of N is always defined as a subset of a bigger set) whose users are potential
opponents to the users of N . We assume that each network verifies the life
principle, that is its users or manager enforces its characteristics or equivalently
reduce its entropy. This implies that the characteristic of the networks are time
dependent. To enforce characteristics of a network, its users must develop a
science which transforms elements outside of the network for its use. On this
purpose they have to develop a graphology to represent the objects of their
study. Different networks need to develop themselves, this induces concurrency,
and justify the following assertion of Jean Paul Sartre: ”Devil are the others”,
this can also be compared to the Indian Maya philosophy. The concurrency
between different networks implies that the results of the knowledge that they
develop is often submitted to a secret law. This gives rise to cryptography.
Cryptography is the science of secrecy of communications, that is, the study
of secret (crypto) writing (graphy) which may be use to:
conceal the meaning of a message (plaintext) for all except for the sender
and the receiver.
Verify the correctness of a message (authentication).
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Cryptography appeared in the earlier human societies:
Ancient Egyptians encrypted their hieroglyphic.
Julius Caesar created the Caesar cipher
Geoffrey Chaucey, an English author included many ciphers in its work.
The clay of Phaistos were enciphered,...
The development of technologies has generated new types of encryption, like
the Jefferson machine.
Electricity and electronic, have introduced a new language: the binary lan-
guage nowadays used to encrypt texts typed with computers. The widespread
development of computer science and internet has provided the need of security
for data exchanged with these techniques. In the recent news, we have learnt
about crimes perpetrated by hackers.
A language E used to write a text is a finite set. A text is an ordered
collection of words, that is a collection of ordered finite subsets of E. Let P (E)
be the set whose elements are subsets of E. An encryption map is a map
h : P (E) → P (E′). Note that the encrypted text can be written in a different
alphabet. In practice the encryption map is described by a key or clue called the
cipher, and the elements of its images are called the ciphertexts. An user uses a
key L, that he applies to the plaintext P to obtain the ciphertext E(L, P ) = C.
The receiver receives the ciphertext C that he decrypts with the key L′, and
obtain D(L′, C) = P .
There exists many types of ciphers which can be divided in two categories:
Symmetric ciphers: these are ciphers for which the knowledge of the key used
for encryption is equivalent to the knowledge of the key used for decryption.
examples of symmetric ciphers are substitutions ciphers like the Caesar cipher,
transposition ciphers.
Asymmetric ciphers: these are ciphers for which the knowledge of the key
used for the encryption does not imply the knowledge of the key used for the
decryption like the R.S.A cipher, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. They are used to
define authentication protocols, digital signatures,... The first method of public
encryption appeared in a classified document published by the Communications-
Electronics Security group, the Britain’s counterpart to N.S.A.
In public encryption, each user U has two keys: its private key L1U and its
public key L2U , the key L
2
U is known by the others users but not the key L
1
U .
The secrecy of this protocol is due to the fact that it is infeasible to compute
L1U with L
2
U . To send a message P to V , U calculates E(P,L
2
V ) = C, to decrypt
the ciphertext C, V calculates D(L1V , C) = P . In practice asymmetric ciphers
are used to exchange symmetric keys between users, since the algorithms which
define these ciphers are slow.
A symmetric cipher must encrypt block of large size of the plaintext if the
length of the plaintext is big, otherwise the statistical properties (like the fre-
quency of letters) of the language used to write the plaintext is reflected in
the ciphertext. It is for these reasons that modern ciphers like D.E.S, A.E.S
symmetric ciphers are applied to blocks of at least 64 bits. These ciphers are
often the composition of many rounds, each round is roughly the composition of
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the following operations: Permutation of the entries of the round, add a round
key, substitution of bits using an S-matrix, the application of a linear map,...
These operations which compose each round have to be elementary to be easily
implemented.
The plaintext block used in modern encryption is often endowed with an
algebraic structure like in A.E.S encryption, where plaintexts block are identified
with elements of a finite field. In this paper, we study plaintexts block endowed
with the structure of a finite algebraic variety or the structure of a finite scheme.
The ciphertexts must resist to cryptanalysis, which is the science of methods
of transforming an unintelligible text, the ciphertext to an intelligible text: the
plaintext. This is the science used by attackers. There exists many different
types of attacks:
Brute force attack: The opponent knows the ciphertext and the algorithm,
he tries every keys to find the plaintext.
Chosen plaintext attacks: the opponent knows the ciphertext, the algorithm,
and he can generates ciphertexts by inserting plaintexts in the encryption ma-
chine
Chosen ciphertext attacks, the opponent knows the ciphertext, the algo-
rithm, and he can generates plaintexts by decrypting ciphertexts.
The main challenge in the organization of a network is the distribution of
keys: suppose that two users U and V of a network N want to exchange en-
crypted data, how the keys needed for encryption can be provided to U and
V with secrecy. There exists many solutions to this problem, like the physical
distribution if the users are not physically far each other, they can use of a third
part called the key distribution center, another solution is public encryption.
The purpose of this paper is to study the geometric properties of cryptogra-
phy. Differential and algebraic geometry are divided in two fields:
The local study, in differential geometry, this is the study of the properties
of differentiable maps of IRn, and in algebraic geometry it is the theory of
commutative rings.
The global study, this is the study of geometric objects which are obtained
by gluing local objects.
Cryptography can be thought as a geometry for which the local study is
the study of encryption and decryption maps, the global study is the study of
encrypted data conveyed in a network, that is link to link encryption, key distri-
bution center,... The main purpose of this paper is to study the global geometry
defined by cryptography. The natural framework for this study is the theory of
sites, these are categories endowed with a topology. We can endow naturally
a network with a topology, and interpret the global geometry of a network in
terms of torsors and higher non commutative cohomology objects defined on
this site. This point of view allow us to describe the key distribution center as
an initial object in a category. And is well adapted for public encryption. The
public and private keys are defined by a flat connection over a torsor, or a flat
connective structure over an n-gerbe. We study also statistical properties of
gerbe encryption.
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I. Topology of categories and torsors.
In this part we present the notion of Grothendieck topology that we shall
use to define encryption protocols in a network.
Definition 1.
A network is a finite oriented graph.
Definitions 2.
Let E be a category, a sieve is a subclass N of the class of objects Ob(E)
of E such that if f : X → Y is a map of E, such that Y ∈ N , then X ∈ N .
Let f : E′ → E be a functor, and R a sieve of E, we denote by Nf , the sieve
defined by Nf = {X ∈ Ob(E′) : f(X) ∈ N}.
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For each object T of E, we denote by ET , the category whose objects are
arrows u : U → T , a morphism of ET between u1 : U1 → T , and u2 : U2 → T ,
is a map h : U1 → U2 such that u2 ◦ h = u1.
Definition 3.
A topology on E is defined as follows: to each object T of E, we associate
a non empty set J(T ) of sieves of the category ET of E, above T such that:
(i) For each map f : T1 → T2, and for each element N of J(T2), N
f ∈ J(T1).
(The morphism f induces a functor between ET1 and ET2 abusively denoted f).
(ii) The sieve N of ET is an element of J(T ), if for every map f : T
′ → T of
E, Nf ∈ J(T ′).
A category endowed with a topology is called a site.
Examples of sites are:
The category of open subsets of a topological space E, for each open subset
U , a sieve is a family of subsets (Ui)i∈ such that
⋃
i∈I Ui = U .
Let L be a field, we consider the category CL whose objects are finite prod-
uct of finite extensions of L, a morphism L1 → L2 induces a L-morphism
Spec(L2) → Spec(L1) between the respective spectrum of L2 and L1. We de-
fine a topology on CL such that for every extension L1 → L2, a sieve of Spec(L2),
is a family of extensions of L2 (Li)i∈I , such that the Galois group Gal(L¯ | L2),
where L¯ is the algebraic closure of L, is the inductive limit of the Galois groups
G(L¯ | Li).
Notations.
Let Ui1 , ..., Uip be objects of a site E, we suppose that there exists a final
objects. Let C be a presheaf of categories defined on E. We will denote by
Ui1..ip the fiber product of Ui1 ,...,Uip over the final object. If ei1 is an object of
C(Ui1), ei1
i2...ip will be the restriction of ei1 to Ui1...ip . For a map h : e → e
′
between two objects of C(Ui1..ip), we denote by h
ip+1..in the restriction of h to
a morphism between eip+1...in → e′
ip+1...in .
Definitions 4.
A sheaf of sets L defined on the category E endowed with the topology J ,
is a contravariant functor L : E → Set, where Set is the category of sets, such
that for each object U of E, and each element R of J(U), the natural map:
L(U) −→ lim(L | R)
is bijective, where (L | R) is the correspondence defined on R by (L | R)(f) =
L(T ) for each map f : T → U in R.
Let h : F → E be a functor, for each object U of E, we denote by FU the
subcategory of F defined as follows: an object T of FU is an object T of F such
that h(T ) = U . A map f : T → T ′ between a pair of objects T and T ′ of FU , is
a map of F such that h(f) is the identity of U . The category FU is called the
fiber of U . For each objects X , and Y of FU , we will denote by HomU (X,Y )
the set of morphisms of FU between X and Y .
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I.1. The topology defined on a network.
Let N be a network, we define the site defined by N as follows:
First we endow N with the structure of an oriented graph defined as follows:
The vertices are the users, there exists an edge from U to V if V can send a
message to U without the use of a third part. To this graph we can associate
the category abusively denoted N , such that HomN (U, V ) is the set of paths
between the users U and V of the graph.
We can define on the category N the topology such that the covering family
of U is the objects V of N , such that there exists an arrow V → U .
The topology defined by a network is not always a topos since we are not
sure that the fiber products exist.
We shall often consider the graph defined byN to be a the lift to the universal
cover of the 1-skeleton of a CW -complex.
Definition 1.
A morphism between the networks N and N ′ is a morphism between their
oriented graphs, that is a map between N and N ′ which sends an oriented edge
of N to an oriented edge of N ′.
A network N is connected if for each users U and U ′ of N , there exists a
path between U and U ′.
Definition 2.
We can also define the following topology: Consider the category NC , whose
objects are networks, we can endow N with the following topology: A sieve of
an object N , is a family of networks (Ni)i∈I , such that there exists an injective
map hi : Ni → N , such that
⋃
i∈I hi(| Ni |) =| N |, where | Ni | is the set of
objects of the network Ni.
Definition 3.
Let N and N ′ be two networks, U and U ′ two respective objects of N and
N ′, the connected sum of N and N ′ is the network N.N ′ obtained by identifying
U and U ′. The set of users of N.N ′ is (N
⋃
N ′ − {U,U ′}) ∪ {U”}, where U” is
an user such that for each user U1 of N , the set of edges between U1 and U”
is the set of edges between U1 and U in N , for every user U2 of N
′, the set of
edges between U2 and U
′ in N ′ is the set of edges between U2 and U”.
The connected sum depends on the elements U and U ′ as shows the following
example: Let N be the network with objects U1, U2, U3 and whose set of arrows
contains only the elements U1 → U2, U1 → U3, and N
′ the network whose set
of users is V1, V2, V3, and whose set of arrows is V1 → V2, V1 → V3. The graph
of the connected sum of N and N ′ in U1 and U2 is a graph which has a vertex
with 4 adjacent edges. The graph of the connected sum of N and N ′ in U1 and
V2 does not have a user such a vertex.
Thus to endow the set of network with a law, we consider pointed networks.
Definition 4.
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A pointed network (N,U) is a network N with a pointed element U . The
connected sum of the pointed networks (N,U) and (N ′, U ′), is the connected
sum of N and N ′ in U and U ′.
A morphism between two pointed networks h : (N,U)→ (N ′, U ′) is a mor-
phism h : N → N ′ such that h(U) = U ′.
We can define [C] the set whose elements are isomorphisms classes of pointed
networks, we denote by [(N,U)] the class of the pointed network (N,U), the
product of pointed networks induces a product on [C] whose neutral element is
the class of the network with one user U and without arrow.
Definition 5.
Let N be a network, and h : U → U ′ an edge of N , (we suppose that h is the
unique edge between U and U ′), the retraction or the suppression of the edge h
is the network N ′ obtained as follows: the set of users of N ′ is N−{U ′}. Let U1
and U2 be two users of N , the set of paths between U1 and U2 is the image of
the set of paths of N by the following application: let (i1 = U1, ..., in = U2) be
a path between U1 and U2 of N , if there exists l such that il = U
′, we replace
U ′ by U .
The groupoid associated to a network.
Let N be a network, we can define the groupoid Gr(N) associated to N
defined as follows: the set of objects of Gr(U) is the set of objects of N . Let U ,
V be two users of N , HomGr(N)(U, V ) is the set of paths between V and U , and
the formal inverse of the path from U to V . Gr(N) is the groupoid associated
to the category induced by N .
Definitions 6.
Let h : F → E be a functor, m : x→ y a map of F , and f = h(m) : T → U
its projection by h. We will say that m is cartesian, or that m is the inverse
image of f by h, or x is an inverse image of y by h, if for each element z of FT ,
the map
HomT (z, x)→ Homf (z, y)
n→ mn
is bijective, where Homf (z, y) is the set of maps g : z → y such that h(g) = f .
A functor h : F → E is a fibered category if and only if each map f :
T → U , has an inverse image, and the composition of two cartesian maps is a
cartesian map.
We will say that the category is fibered in groupoids, if for each diagram
x
f
−→z
g
←−y
of F above the diagram of E,
U
φ
−→W
ψ
←−V
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and for each map m : U → V such that ψm = φ, there exists a unique map
p : x→ y, such that gp = f , and h(p) = m.
This implies that the inverse image is unique up to isomorphism.
Consider a map φ : U → V of E, we can define a functor φ∗ : FV → FU ,
such that for each object y of FV , φ
∗(y) is defined as follows: we consider a
cartesian map f : x→ y above φ and set φ∗(y) = x. Remark that although the
definition of φ∗(y) depends of the chosen inverse image f , the functors (φψ)∗
and ψ∗φ∗ are isomorphic.
Definitions 7.
A section of a fibered category h : F → E, is a correspondence defined on
the class of arrows of E as follows: to each map f : U → T , we define a cartesian
map: uf : xU → yT of F , whose image by h is f such that: u
f ′f = uf
′
◦ uf .
Definition 8.
Let C be a site, a torsor h : P → C is a fibered category such that there
exists a section u.
We suppose that there exists a sheafH defined on C, such thatHomU (nU , nU ) =
H(U), where HomU (nU , nU ) is the set of morphisms p : nU → nU such that
h(p) = IdU , and nU ∈ PU .
Every arrow of P is invertible,
For every object eU , eV of PU , there exists a map h : eU → eV .
The classifying cocycle associated to a torsor.
Let (Ui)i∈I be a covering family of the topology of the site C, and P → C, a
torsor defined on C, for each object U , we consider the object eU of PU defined
by uId where u is the section.
Let U be an element of C, suppose that there exists a map di : Ui → U ,
we can define the Cartesian map d′i : ei → eU over di, there exists a map
ui : ei → eUi since the fibered category is connected. Suppose that Ui ×U Uj
exists, then we can define the map uij : e
i
Uj
→ eiUj by ui ◦uj
−1, this make sense
since the fact that u is a section implies that eiUj is e
j
Ui
.
The family of maps uij verifies uijujl = uil
Proposition 1.
Suppose that C is a site the set of torsors bounded by the sheaf H is 1 to 1
with H1(C,H).
Definition 9.
A torsor P → C is trivial if and only if for every object U , and every
map di : Ui → U , the Cartesian map above di is a map ui : ei → eU , where
ei = u
IdUi .
Let (Ui)i∈I be a covering family of the site C, a torsor on C is trivial, if
and only if for each object Ui, there exists an element di ∈ Aut(PUi) such that
ui1i2 = ui2ui1
−1. Indeed since for di : U → Ui e
i
U is ei, ui is an automorphism
of ei, thus an element of H(Ui).
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Examples of torsors.
LetN be a differentiable manifold, a principal bundle whose structural group
is H is an example of torsor defined on the topos defined by the topology of N .
Let N be a network, we have seen that in modern encryption plaintexts are
encrypted by blocks to create diffusion and confusion. Without restricting the
generality, we shall call N the category defined by the network.
We define P → N a category fibered over N such that for each user U , the
fiber PU is a category whose objects are sets of plaintexts for example, the n-
dimensional IZ/2IZ-vector space. A map between two objects lU and l
′
U of PU ,
is a bijection defined by an encryption/decryption map, that is a bijective map
h : lU → l
′
U such that for each element C ∈ lU , h(C) = E(L,C). An example
of object can be the domain of the D.E.S map which is the 64-dimensional
IZ/2IZ-vector space.
Let V be another user of the network, suppose that V can send a message
to U , which is equivalent to saying that there is a map between hUV : U → V
in N . A Cartesian map above hUV is a map defined by encryption/decryption
map as above h′UV : lV → lU .
This fiber category is a torsor, if for every user U of N , there exists an object
lU , in the fiber of U an encryption/decryption map h
′
UV : lV → lU above each
map hUV : V → U , such that (hU1U2 ◦ hU2U3)
′ = h′U1U2 ◦ h
′
U2U3
.
Definition 10.
Let (N,U) and (N ′, U ′) two pointed networks, supposed that there exist
torsors P → N , and P ′ → N ′ such that PU and P
′
U ′ are isomorphic categories,
then we can define the torsor P.P ′ over the connected sum of N and N ′ NN ′
as follows: If U1 is an object of N − {U}, then P.P
′
U1 is PU1 , if U2 is an object
of N ′, then P.P ′U2 is P
′
U2
. The fiber of the point U” which is obtained by
identifying U with U ′ is PU .
Let h1 : U1 → V1 be an arrow of N , we lift h1 to P.P
′ to one of its lift
defined by P → N . Let h2 : U2 → V2 be an arrow of N
′, we lift h2 to P.P
′ to
one of its lift defined by P ′ → N ′.
Contraction of torsor.
Let N be a network, and Nh, the contraction of the arrow h : U → U
′ of N ,
consider the torsor P → N , we can define a torsor Ph → Nh, as follows: consider
an edge h1 : U1 → U2, such that h1 is the projection of an edge h2 : V1 → V2 of
N by the canonical map N → Nh. Suppose that V1 and V2 are different of U
′,
then the Cartesian map associated to h1 is the Cartesian map of h2, suppose
that V1 = U
′, then h projects to the arrow h1 : U → U2, the Cartesian map
above h1 is the cartesian map above h2◦h : U → V2, suppose that V2 = U
′, then
the Cartesian map above h1 is h
′−1 ◦ h′2, where h
′
2 is the Cartesian map above
h2, and h
′ is the Cartesian map above h which is assumed to be invertible.
The Diffie-Hellman torsor.
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The following torsor can be used in public encryption:
Let C be a finite topos, that is such that the class of objects of C is a finite
set. We suppose that there exists a torsor P → C such that for each object
U , the group of automorphisms of PU is the multiplicative group IZ/nIZ −{0},
where n is a prime number, consider a generator α of the multiplicative group
IZ/nIZ −{0}, we suppose that for every objects U , V of C, there exists nU and
nV in IZ such that the transition function defined on U ×C V is hnU ◦ hnV
−1,
where hnU is the function defined on IZ/nIZ − {0} by c → α
nU c, and the final
object of C is abusively denoted C. This torsor is trivial.
The public key of the user U is αnU , its private key is nU . Suppose that
U want to send a message to V , he takes the public key αnV and calculates
αnUnV = (αnV )nU
To decrypt the message, V take the public key αnU of U and calculates
αnUnV = (αnV )nU . This is the Diffie-Helmann algorithm. The security is due
to the fact that it is infeasible to calculate discrete logarithm in reasonable time.
I.2. Connection on torsors and encryption.
In this part we present the theory of torsors defined on a site, and show
how it can be used to define public encryption. It is a generalization of the
Diffie-Hellman torsor.
Let N be a manifold, P → N , a principal bundle whose structural group is
H , defined by the trivialization (Ui, uij)i,j∈I a connection on H is defined by a
family of 1-forms αi : Ui → H, where H is the Lie algebra of H , which satisfy
the relation:
αj − αi = uij
−1duij
The curvature of the connection α is the 2-form defined locally by dαi +
αi ∧ αi. The bundle is flat if the curvature vanishes. Suppose that the group
H is commutative, then if the curvature vanishes, then d(αi) = 0, we deduce
the existence of a 1-chain ui : Ui → H such that d(ui) = αi. The cocycle
hij = uijuj
−1ui is called the holonomy cocycle of the connection. We remark
that in this situation the connection is completely characterized by the 0-chain
(ui)i∈I . This motivates the following definition:
Definition 1.
A flat connection on P is a 0-chain (ui)i∈I ui : Ui → H . We do not suppose
that our group is commutative.
This definition characterizes only flat bundles defined over a manifold when
the group H is commutative.
Holonomy map.
Let Ui and Uj be objects of C, and (i1 = i, ..., in = j) a path between
Ui and Uj, we can defined the holonomy map Hol(α) : PUi → PUj which
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is the composition of the following maps: Holil : PUil → PUil+1 defined by
uiil+1iluil
−1uil+1 . Thus Hol(α) = Holin−1 ◦ ... ◦Holi1
The holonomy map will be used to define example of the encryption map
between PUi and PUj .
The holonomy cocycle of the connection is uijuiuj
−1
If P → N is a principal bundle defined over the manifold N , this is similar
to the usual definition of connection.
The holonomy map characterizes completely a torsor over a connected site
N , which can be defined as a representation Hol : pi1(Gr(N)) → PU0 , where
pi1(Gr(N)) is the fundamental group of the groupoid Gr(N), and PU0 the fiber
at U0.
Generalization of the Diffie-Hellmann torsor.
We consider here networks endowed with the natural topology that we have
defined.
Let P → C be a torsor defined by the generating family (Ui)i∈I , and the
transition functions uij of the topology of C, we denote by H the structural
group of P . We suppose that there exists a commutative group H, and a map
exp : H → H , which will play the role of the exponential map of the group H .
We shall suppose that the exponential map is surjective.
Definition 2.
A public encryption defined on the torsor P → C is defined by the following
data:
A connection (ui)i∈I defined on the torsor C, we denote by αi an element
of H such that exp(αi) = ui.
A function L : H × H → V , where V is a commutative group such that
L(αi, exp(αj)) = L(αj , exp(αi))
The public key of the user Ui is exp(αi), and its private key is αi.
The key that the users Ui and Uj use to exchange data is L(αi, exp(αj)).
The security of this problem is related to the fact that it is not feasible to
compute the logarithm of H .
A particular example of the previous public encryption protocol is the situ-
ation when the value of the function L is defined the coordinate changes. This
can be realized as follows: if the torsor is trivial, in this situation there exists
a 0-chain ui : Ui → H such that uij = uiuj
−1. We denote αi = Log(ui),
L(αi, exp(αj) = uj) = uiuj
−1.
The secret key of the user Ui is αi, and its public key is ui.
Meet in the Middle attack.
Suppose that an intruder Ul register to the network he can perform the fol-
lowing Meet-in-the-Middle attack, he calculates L(αl, ui) = uli, and L(αl, uj) =
11
ulj . Since the inversion is assumed to be a feasible operation, Ul can calculate
uli
−1ulj = uilulj = uij which is the key that share the users Ui and Uj .
We shall prove that higher non commutative cohomology can enable to
counter this attack.
The Grothendieck group of the equivalence class of torsors over a
network.
Let N be a network, consider two torsors P, P ′ → N whose fiber are vector
spaces defined over a field. We can make the tensor product P ⊗ P ′ of these
networks, which is itself a torsor over N . If P and P ′ are respectively defined
by the transition functions uij and u
′
ij , then P ⊗ P
′ is defined by uij ⊗ u
′
ij .
We can define the dual of P to be the torsor over N defined by the transition
functions (u∗ij)
−1, where u∗ij is the dual map of uij .
We can define the Grothendieck group of this category. which is the group
whose elements are equivalence classes of the previous torsors.
Examples of Grothendieck groups can be defined by cryptography: Consider
a class D of cipher maps defined on a the category of L-vector spaces ( L
can be thought to be IZ/2IZ) stable by addition and tensor product, that is if
u : V → V , and u′ : V ′ → V ′ are in this class, we suppose also that u−1 is
isomorphic to an element of D, u+u′ and u⊗u′ are also isomorphic to elements
of D. We can consider the category whose objects are torsors P → N , such that
the transition functions uij are elements of D. We can define the Grothendieck
group of this category.
Many ciphers in cryptography have the following structure: they are a suc-
cession of p rounds, and each round is defined as follows: the plaintext is a vector
of an even dimensional vector space over IZ/2IZ, it is divided in two halves, the
left half LE0, and the right half RE0, we have:
LEi+1 = REi, REi+1 = LEi +H(REi, LEi, Li)
where Li is a round key. After the p-round, the both halves are swapped.
The decryption map is the encryption map with the keys used in the inverse
order.
This class of cipher is stable by addition, inverse, and tensor product. We
can define its Grothendieck group.
If we suppose that the transition functions are linear maps, the category of
torsors defined over a network N is a Tannakian category, it is thus equivalent
to the category of representations of an affine group scheme. These networks are
not useful in practice, since they are vulnerable to a chosen ciphertext attack:
If an attacker can obtain ciphertexts from given plaintexs, to retrieve the key
he has only to choose a set of plaintexts which is a basis of the vector space V .
These cipher are called Hill ciphers and are used in the Mix colums operations
of modern ciphers.
I.3 Link to Link encryption and torsors.
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Let C be a network, an user Ui who sends a message through the network
to Uj often does not encrypt the whole message: the header, that is the part of
the message where is recorded the identity of the sender and the identity of the
receiver, is either in clear, or encrypted and decrypted at every node of the path
between Ui and Uj , that is, if Ui wants to send the message N to Uj using the
path (i1 = i, ..., in = j). An appendN1 called the header of the message is added
to the message. It cannot be encrypted with the algorithm used to encrypt N
since in modern network like internet, the route of the message is not controlled
by the sender, but to be sent from il to il+1, the header is encrypted, by an
encryption function uil+1il , we can suppose that this encryption is a symmetric
encryption, thus the encryption function used by Uil+1 to send messages to Ui
is uilil+1 = uil+1il
−1, if we denote by uil the encryption of the header from
Ui to Ul, we have uil = uijujl if Uj is an intermediate stage. If we suppose
that the header are elements of a set E, and the transition functions uij are
automorphisms of E, these data define a torsor P → C over the site C such
that for each object Ui, PUi is a set isomorphic to E.
The definition of a torsor over a site used to encrypt the header of a message
can be very useful. Practically, the manager of a network has to define or find a
simple procedure to define the keys at every nodes for the link to link encryption.
Often in mathematics a torsor is defined in a global way, without defining each
coordinates changes, for example: the tangent space of a manifold, or of an
algebraic variety,.. this can enable to save a lot of time in the implementationsof
a network.
We propose the following scheme to define a link to link encryption:
We consider a smooth affine algebraic variety N defined over a finite field,
we consider a trivialization (Ui)i∈I of one of its canonical bundle like its tangent
bundle. We can define a network whose users are the Ui, the transition functions
of the bundle considered are the keys used for link to link encryption.
Under reasonable conditions on the structure of the encryption algorithm of
the header, the previous remark is always true:
Proposition 1.
Suppose that the header is written in an alphabet which can be identified with
a scheme, and the transition functions are morphisms of scheme, the objects Ui
are schemes and the transition functions define an effective descent datum, then
there exists a torsor P → C of schemes, such that the typical fiber is the alphabet
endowed with its scheme structure.
Suppose that the transition functions do not define morphisms of a scheme,
the network topos N defines the 1-skeleton of a CW-complex N , (the CW -
complex is not necessarily unique) the transition functions define a flat bundle
on N .
I.4 Key distribution Center and initial object.
One of the big challenge in symmetric encryption is to establish protocols of
distribution of keys in a network. When the participants are not very far each
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other, this can be accomplished by physical distribution. When the number of
members of the network is very big, physical distribution is quite impossible, a
solution of this problem is to ask to a third part to distribute keys to participants,
such a third part is called a Key distribution center. The key distribution center
share a master key with each user that he uses to send sessional keys.
Let D be the key distribution center of the network C, we assume that C is a
site, and the members of the network are objects ofC, the key distribution center
must have a connection with every participant, since a connection between D
and the object U can be represented by a map HomC(U,D), we shall assume
that D is the initial object in the category C. Suppose that D distributes keys
in a link to link network, we have seen that we can represent such a network by
a torsor P → C, for every object Ui of C, there exists a map uid : PUi → PD,
this map is the master key used by U .
Suppose that Ui wants to establish a connection with Uj , there exist many
protocols in the literature that he can use, for example:
Ui sends to D a message encrypted with uid which contains an identifier
IDUi of Ui and an identifier IDUj of Uj .
The key distribution center replies to Ui by sending the sessional key uji
encrypted with uid,
The key distribution center sends to Uj a message encrypted with ujd which
contains the key uij and an identifier of Ui
The link to link encryption is defined by a torsor over a site, we have seen
that under reasonable conditions, we can suppose that this torsor can be defined
as a flat bundle over a scheme, or a differentiable manifold. Flat bundle over a
manifold N is determined by a representation of the fundamental group of N
which defines the holonomy. Thus it is completely determined by the 2-skeleton
of the manifold, in practice we shall consider differentiable surface, or algebraic
surfaces in link to link encryption.
The knowledge of the genus of the surface used to define keys in a link to
link network can be a very useful information for an attacker because the space
of flat bundles over a surface of a given genus is an object which is well-known
in mathematics.
Suppose that an attacker L wants to make an attack on the link to link en-
cryption network. His purpose is thus to determine keys used to encrypt header
of the messages sent in the network. This can be a very useful information, since
this will enable L to know the identity of the peoples who send messages in the
network. A possibility for L is to perform a brute force attack: We assume that
the messages are written in binary and their length are n, and L have a set of
chosen plaintext ciphertext for each couples of users (Ui, Uj), we assume also
that there does not exists spurious keys. thus to determine the key used by Ui
and Uj , L must try 2
n! keys if the header are written with n-bits, if there exists
N participants, he has to make C2N2
n! operations. But if L knows the topology
of the network, that is the genus of the surface used, he can determine the car-
dinal of a set of generators of the fundamental group the surface involved, this
number can be small, whenever the number of the participants of the network
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is huge, the holonomy is parameterized by the image of the generators of the
fundamental group, thus the topological information about the surface can be
a crucial information when N >>> 0, and the genus is small, since in this
situation a brute force attack is impossible.
I.5. Implementation of the link to link encryption.
One of the main challenge in computer science is to define less expensive
algorithms, that is an algorithm which can be computed in reasonable time
with a computer. It has been shown that every algorithm can be computed
with the Turing machine, but to be efficient the implementation must be run
with an existing computer.
To define link to link encryption defined on a site C, we need a priori to
define each couple of keys uij for any users Ui and Uj of C. We shall show how
the holonomy representation can reduce the algorithm.
We shall assume that the torsor P → C which defines the link to link
encryption is a bundle over a surface N2. We endow the surface with a CW-
structure, and perform a cutting along the 1-skeleton. We assume that the
genus of the surface is different of zero. The surface is then the quotient of
an hyperbolic or Euclidean polygon. The vertices of the polygon represent the
0-skeleton of the CW-decomposition. Each edge uiuj projects to N2 to define
an element of pi1(N2).
There can exists in the network elements different of the vertices, these
elements can be considered to be element u2n+1, ..., u2n+p in the interior of
the polygon. Thus the users of the network are the vertices u1, ..., u2n and
u2n+1, ..., u2n+p.
We suppose that the messages conveyed in the network are written in binary,
and are encoded in block of length l. As before, we shall assume that the
fiber is an algebraic variety, and the transition functions are element of the
automorphisms group H of this variety.
The bundle P → N2 is defined by a representation h : pi1(N2)→ H .
We can define the algorithm:
Write ”Enter the vertices”
From i = 1 to i = 2n
Write enter ui, read ui
Write ”Enter the interior points”
For i = p+ 1 to i = 2n+ p
Write enter ui, read ui
Write ”Enter the holonomy”
For i = 1 to i = n− 1 do
Write enter uii+1, read uii+1
Write ”enter un1, read un1
uii = Id
For i = 1 to i = n do
For j = i+ 1 to j = n do
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uij = uij−1uj−1j
For i = 1 to i = 2n+ p do
For j = 2n+ 1 to j = 2n+ p do
uij = Id
This program enter the keys needed to define a link to link encryption defined
by a torsor P → C isomorphic to a bundle over a surface of genus n.
II. Non abelian cohomology and End to End encryption.
We have seen that the notion of torsor is not a good notion to provide secrecy
in End to End encryption. We shall provide a method of encryption using non
Abelian cohomology.
II.1. Gerbes and encryption.
The notion of gerbe have been defined by Giraud to study gluing problems
in geometry. Let h : P → N be a principal bundle defined over the manifold N ,
whose structural group is H , suppose that there exists an extension 1→ H1 →
H2 → H , a fundamental question in geometry is to define a principal bundle
h′ : P ′ → N whose structural is H2, such that there exists a map l : P
′ → P
such that h ◦ l = h′. This problem has been one of the motivation to formulate
gerbe theory.
Proposition-Definition 1.
Suppose that E is a site whose topology is generated by a covering family
(Ui → U)i∈I , and h : F → E a fibered category in groupoids. For each map
f : U → V of E, we consider the functor rU,V (f) : FV → FU defined as follows:
For each object y of FV , rU,V (f)(y) is an object x of FU such that there exists a
cartesian map n : x→ y such that h(n) = f . Consider the maps v1 : U1 → U2,
and v2 : U2 → U3 of E, the functors rU1,U2(v1) ◦ rU2,U3(v2) and rU1,U3(v2v1) are
isomorphic. The functor h : F → E is a sheaf of categories if and only if the
correspondence U → FU = F (U) satisfies the following properties:
(i) Gluing condition for arrows.
Let U be an object of E, and x, y objects of F (U). The functor from EU ,
endowed with the restriction of the topology J , to the category of sets which
associates to an object f : V → U the set HomV (rV,U (f)(x), rV,U (f)(y)) is a
sheaf of sets.
(ii) Gluing condition for objects.
Consider a covering family (Ui → U)i∈I of an object U of E, and for each
Ui, an object xi of F (Ui). Let tij : x
i
j → x
j
i , a map between the respective
restrictions of xj and xi to Ui×U Uj, (we suppose that the fiber product over U
exists) such that on Ui1 ×U Ui2 ×U Ui3 , the restrictions of the arrows ti1i3 and
ti1i2ti2i3 are equal. There exists an object x of F (U) whose restriction to F (Ui)
is xi.
If moreover the following properties are verified:
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(iii) There exists a covering family (Ui → U)i∈I of E such that F (Ui) is not
empty,
(iv) For each pair of objects x, and y of F (Ui), HomUi(x, y) is not empty
(local connectivity),
(v) The elements of HomUi(x, y) are invertible. The fibered category is called
a gerbe.
(vi) We say that the gerbe is bounded by the sheaf LF defined on E, or
that LF is the band of the gerbe, if and only if there exists a sheaf of groups
LF defined on E such that for each object x of F (U) we have an isomorphism:
LF (U)→ HomU (x, x)
which commutes with restrictions, and with morphisms between objects.
The classifying cocycle of a gerbe.
We suppose that the site C is defined by a covering family (Ui)i∈I , such that
PUi is not empty.
We consider an object ui of PUi , let u
j
i be the restriction of ui to Ui ×U Uj ,
(where U is an object such that the fiber products over U exist) the local
connectivity implies the existence of a map there exists a map uij : u
j
i → u
i
j ,
On Ui ×U Uj ×U Ul = Uijl, we have the objects u
jl
i , u
il
j , u
ij
l , we can define
the map uijl = uliuijujl : u
ij
l → u
ij
l , this map can be identified with an element
of L(Uijl)
Theorem 1.
The family of maps uijl defines a non commutative 2-Cech cocycle. The set
of equivalence classes of gerbes bounded by H is one to one with H2(C,L).
To apply this construction to the problem mentioned at the beginning of
this paragraph, we define the following sheaf of categories: for each open subset
U of N , we define the category C(U) such that the object of C(U) are bundles
whose structural group is H2, and such that the quotient by H1 is the restriction
of P to U . The sheaf of category U → C(U) is a gerbe defined on C bounded
by the sheaf of H1 valued functions defined on N .
II.1.2. A protocol to define end to end encryption and link to link
encryption with gerbe.
Consider a network N , endowed with the topology that we have defined
above. Let C → N be a fibered category such that for each object U of N ,
CU is a category whose objects are isomorphic to a set of plaintext/ciphertext,
for example objects of CU can be isomorphic to a IZ/2IZ-vector space. A map
between two objects of CU is an encryption/decryption map. We suppose that
there exists a sheaf H2 on N , such that for each object eU of C(U), Aut(eU ) =
H2(U), and this sheaf is the band of the gerbe defined by C. In practice, this
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gerbe can be defined as follows: we suppose that there exists an exact sequence
of sheaves
1→ H2 → H1 → H → 1
defined on N . There exists an H-torsor P → N , such that the fiber PU is a
set of plaintext/ciphertext used to write the header of messages conveyed in the
network. Consider the gerbe C which represents the geometric obstruction to
lift the structural group of P to H21, for each object U of C, the objects of CU
are plaintexts these are the messages conveyed in the network. The projection
of these objects to PU is their respective headers.
We can modify the previous example as follows: we suppose that the header
of the message are written with an alphabet which has the group structure H ,
and the main part of the alphabet is written with an alphabet which has the
group structure H1. In this situation the transition functions are keys of en-
cryption/decryption of monoalphabetic ciphers, since they are applied to each
letter. To create confusion and diffusion, we can assume that the encrypted
plaintexts are encrypted by blocks, and the transition functions defined polyal-
phabetic ciphers which are more resistent to the statistical study of the common
properties of a set plaintext/ciphertext.
This kind of protocol can be applied to internet in the email distribution,
since the route of the message is not defined by the sender, thus the encryption
of the header cannot be encrypted using the key used to encrypt the main
message: The header is written with H and the main part of the message with
H1.
Meet in the Middle attack of encryption defined by gerbes.
The following attack can be performed on the previous encryption protocol:
Suppose that there exists three intruders in the networks, Ui, Uj , and Ul
suppose that they want to obtain the secret key used by the users Uc and
Ud, they know the keys uij , uic, uid, ujc, ujd, uil, ujl, ucl, udl thus they know the
quantities uijc = uciuijujc, uijd, uilc, and uild, using the fact that the classifying
cocycle of the gerbe is trivial (we assume the band to be commutative), we
obtain:
ujcd − uicd + uijd − uijc = 0,
and
ujcd − ulcd + uljd − uljc = 0
This implies that
ulcd − uljd + uljc − uicd + uijd − uijc = 0
Thus the intruders can deduce the value of ulcd − uicd since they know the
values of uljd, uljc, uijd, uijc we know that ulcd = udlulcucd, and uicd = udiuicucd
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since the intruder know udl, ulc, udi and uic, they can deduce the key ucd if udlulc
is different of udiuic
−1.
This type of attack cannot be performed with two intruder, if we consider the
cocycle relation ujcd−uicd+uijd−uijc = 0, the substraction of the expressions
ujcd = udjujcucd and −uicd = −udiuicucd implies the cancellation of ucd thus
ucd cannot be written as a function of the other keys.
Remark that a network with 3 users whose plaintext/ciphertext are element
of a given set, and the encryption/decryption maps are automorphisms of this
set is always a gerbe since the cocycle relation is always verified.
We shall define a notion of higher non Abelian cohomology which can enable
to counter the previous attack. What can be expected is the fact that there exists
a notion of n-gerbe such that every network of n-users which share information
written in the same alphabet is a n-gerbe. Unfortunately, the question of the
existence of a theory of n-gerbe is a deep question in mathematics which is
not completely solve nowadays. The first author of this paper has provided
a cohomological description of cohomology classes of higher rank, there other
theories such as the thesis of Zouhair Tamsamani.
II.1.3. Connective structure on gerbe and public-key encryption.
Let N be a differential manifold, and C a gerbe defined on N , we shall
suppose that the gerbe C is bounded by a commutative group L and denote by
L the Lie algebra of L. The notion of connective structure on gerbe have been
defined by Brylinski and Deligne to study the differential geometry of gerbes,
and of infinite dimensional bundles. It this the notion analog to the notion of
connection defined on manifolds.
Definition 1.
A connective structure defined on the Abelian gerbe C → N , bounded by
the commutative group L is defined by:
For each open subset U of N , and each eU of C(U), a torsor Co(eU ) of L
valued 1-forms defined on U , which is called the torsor of connections,
We suppose that Co(eU ) behaves naturally in respect of restrictions.
For every maps u : eU → e
′
U between the objects eU and e
′
U of C(U), there
exists a map u∗ : Co(eU ) → Co(e
′
U ) compatible with the composition and
restriction to smaller subsets.
For each morphism h of eU , and each element ∇eU of Co(eU ), we have:
h∗∇eU = ∇eU + h
−1dh
Let (Ui)i∈I be a trivialization of the gerbe, that its a covering family of N
such that C(Ui) is not empty andt its objects are isomorphic each others. We
consider ei an object of C(Ui), and an element αi ∈ Co(ei) in Ui ∩ Uj , we can
define αij = αj − uij
∗αi, we have the relation:
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(1) αjl − αil + αij = uijl
−1duijl
Definition 2.
The curving of a gerbe is defined as follows:
For each object eU of C(eU ), and each connection ∇eU of Co(eU ), a 2-form
H(eU ) defined on U such that for each 1-form α defined on U , H(∇eU + α) =
H(eU ) + dα.
A connective structure is flat if and only if the curving is zero.
Suppose that the curving of a connective structure is zero, and the gerbe
is defined by a good cover (Ui)i∈I , we choose an object ei of C(Ui), and an
element αi of Co(ei), we have αj = αij +αi, since the curving is zero, H(αi) =
H(αj) = 0. This implies that d(αij) = 0. Thus there exists cij : Uij → L such
that dcij = αij . The equality 1 implies that d(cjl − cil + cij) = dLog(uijl).
Denote by c′ij = exp(cij). The 2-Cech cocycle uijlcjlcil
−1cij is the holonomy
cocycle.
We remark that the flatness of the bundle is completely characterized by the
fact that the family of 1-form αij are closed, thus by the existence of the cocycle
c′ij . This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3.
Let D be a gerbe defined over the site C, bounded by the commutative sheaf,
a flat connective structure of C is a 1-Cech L-chain.
An example of connective structure defined on a gerbe is a connective struc-
ture defined on gerbe C defined by an extension problem 1 → H1 → H2 →
H → 1 as follows:
Consider the H-principal bundle P → N , and a connection ∇ defined on P ,
for each object eU of C(eU ), we can consider the set of connections of eU which
project to the restriction of ∇ to U .
If the bundle P → N is flat, we have seen that a connection is defined by
a 0-chain ui → L, this motivates the following definition that will be used to
define symmetric encryption:
Definition 4.
Let D be a gerbe defined on the site C, we suppose that there exists a flat
torsor P → C such that C is the gerbe associated to the lifting problem defined
by the exact sequence 1 → H1 → H2 → H → 1. A connective structure on C,
is a 1-H2 Cech chain c1 defined on C, such that there exists a 0-chain c0, such
that c1 is the lift of the boundary of c0 by the map H2 → H . We shall denote
this connective structure by (c0, c1), or (ci, cij) in local coordinates.
To define the classifying cocycle of the gerbe D, we consider a trivialization
Ui, u
′
ij of the torsor P , let [c] denote the cohomology class of this cocycle, the
classifying cocycle is obtained by the image of [c] by the map H1(C,H) →
H2(C,H1). We can defined the element uij which projection by the map H2 →
H is u′ij .
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Definition 5.
LetD be a gerbe defined by an exact sequence, (ci, cij) a connective structure
defined on D, we consider a lift c′i of ci in H2, using the map H2 → H . A public
encryption defined on the gerbe C, is defined by the following data:
A function J : H2 ×H2 → H2,
such that for every J(Ln(c′i), c
′
j) = uij .
This encryption is more secured than the encryption defined by a torsor
since the Chasles relation is not satisfied by the family of uij .
The private key of the user Ui is Log(c
′
i), and its public key is c
′
i, as usual
the secrecy is due to the fact that it infeasible to compute the logarithm in a
reasonable time.
II.3. Non commutative cohomology and probabilistic theory of
ciphers.
The purpose of this part is to study the unconditional security of the ciphers
defined with a gerbe.
Let N be a network, Ui and Uj users of N , we suppose that Ui and Uj
exchanged texts written in an alphabet, and these texts are encrypted by blocks
which are element of a set E. We suppose that the encryption in the network is
defined by a gerbe D, and the objects of DUi are isomorphic to E. We shall first
study the following question: what is the probability that Ui sends the plaintext
C to Ui by following the path (i1 = i, ..., in = j).
The local study.
We study first the probability for a given cipher encrypted by Ui to be
received by Uj where there exists an edge between Ui and Uj . The plaintexts
that Ui encrypts or decrypts are elements of an object Ei of the fibers CUi . We
suppose that Ei is endowed with a probability. To each plaintext P
l
i of Ei we
assign the probability pli.
The keys used by Ui are the transition functions uji, the cardinal of the set
of this keys is the cardinal of the band H2 of the gerbe. This is due to the fact
that the set of transition functions between Ei and Ej is in bijection with the
band. The set of keys Uji used by Ui to send messages to Ui is a probabilistic
space we denote the probability of the key ulji, d
l
ji. We assume that the choice
of a plaintext is an event independent to the choice of a key.
Consider the probability space Uji × Ei, endowed with the product of the
probability of Ei and Uji. A cipher Cj is received by Uj is represented by the
subspace of Uji × Ei whose elements (u
l
ji, P
l
i ) verifies u
l
ji(P
l
i ) = Cj . Thus the
probability pCj to obtain the cipher Cj is:
pCj =
∑
P l
i
∈Ei,ulji∈Uji,u
l
ji
(P l
i
)=Cj
dljip
l
i
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The global study.
We consider now the situation when Ui sends a plaintext P
l
i to Uj true
the network, by following the path (i1 = i, ..., in = j). When an user Uip
receives a plaintext/ciphertext from Uip−1 , he uses a key uip+1ip chosen ran-
domly to send a message to Uip+1 . Thus we consider the product of proba-
bility spaces Πp=n−1p=1 Uip+1ip × Pip . An event of this space is a collection of
events (ui2i, Pi), (ui3i2 , Pi2 ), ..., (ujin−1 , Pin−1). The probability pCj represents
the probability of the plaintext/ciphertext to be obtained by Uj when a mes-
sage is sent by Ui conveyed in the path (i1 = i, ..., in = j).:
pCj =
∑
u
l1
ii2
,...u
ln−1
jin−1
,uip+1ip (Pip )=Pip+1 ,ujin−1 (Pin−1)=Cj
dl1i2ipid
l2
i3i2
pi2 ...d
lin−1
jin−1
pin−1
Where dlp ip+1ip is the probability of the key uip+1ip , and pip the probability of
the event Pip .
The probability pCj depends on the path used by Ui to send a message
to Uj as shows the following example: consider the network whose set of users
is {U1, U2, U3, U4}, and such that there exists a path between {U1, U2}, {U2, U4},
{U1, U3}, {U3, U4}. We assume that each user Ui has a couple of plaintext/ciphertext
P i1, P
i
2 . We denote by uji, the unique key between Ui and Uj . Suppose that the
probability of the plaintetx/ciphertext P 41 to be received by U4 from U2 is 1,
the probability of P 41 to be received by U4 from U3 is 0, a message sent by U1
to U4 using the path U1U2U4 is different to a message sent by U1 to U4 using
the path U1U3U4.
Consider a set of plaintext/ciphertext Pi ∈ Ei, ..., Pin−1 ∈ Ein−1 . The condi-
tional probability of the plaintext/ciphertext Cj to be realized given Pi, ..., Pin−1
is:
pCj|(Pi,...,Pin−1) =
∑
u
l1
ii2
,...u
ln−1
jin−1
,uip+1ip (Pip )=Pip+1 ,ujin−1 (Pin−1 )=Cj
dl1i2id
l2
i3i2
...d
lin−1
jin−1
The Bayes formula implies that the conditional probability p(Pi,..,Pin−1)|Cj
is
pCj |(Pi,...,Pin−1 )
pCj
.
Definition 1.
A path has perfect secrecy if and only if p(Pi,..,Pin−1)|Cj = pipi2 ...pin−1 . That
is, if the knowledge of a ciphertext obtained by Uj by an attacker does not give
him information about the plaintext/ciphertext chosen at every node.
Proposition 1.
Suppose that at every node, (i, i2), ..., (in−1, j) there exists perfect secrecy,
then the path (i1 = i, i2, ..., in−1, j) has perfect secrecy.
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Proof.
Suppose that there exists perfect secrecy at every node. Let Pi ∈ Ei, Pi2 ∈
Ei2 , ...Pin−1 ∈ Ein−1 , we have:
pip =
∑
uipip−1(Pip−1 )=Pip
dipip−1
∑
uipip−1(Pip−1 )=Pip
pipdipip−1
If we multiply pi, ..., pin−1 using the previous formula, we obtain the result.
Suppose that the system has perfect secrecy, and the probability pCj > 0,
for any set of plaintexts/ciphertexts Pi ∈ Ei, ..., Pin−1 ∈ Ein−1 , we have pCj =
p(Cj | (Pi, .., Pin−1) =
∑
ui2i(Pi)=Pi2 ,...,uin−1j(Pin−1 )=Pj
dii2 ...djin−1 > 0, this
implies that there exists ui1i, ..., ujin−1 such that uipip−1(Pip−1) = Pip . Thus the
cardinal of the set of keys (that is the cardinal of H2) used by Uip−1 is greater
than the cardinal of the set of plaintext/ciphertext used Uip which the cardinal
| E | of E. The following result is a corollary of the Shannon theorem:
Theorem 1.
Suppose that the user Ui sends message to Uj using the path (i1 = i, ..., in =
j). Suppose also that | E |=| H2 |, Then the path has perfect secrecy if the
following conditions are satisfied:
Every key is used with the probability 1|H2|
For every set of plaintetxt/ciphertext (Pi ∈ Ei, ..., Pin−1 ∈ Ein−1), and every
set of plaintext/ciphertext P ′i2 ∈ Ei2 , .., P
′
j ∈ Ej, there exists an unique set of
keys ui2i, .., ujin−1 such that uipip−1(Pip−1) = P
′
ip
.
Proof.
The Shannon theorem shows that there exists a perfect secrecy at every node
(ip−1, ip) if and only if every key is used with probability
1
|H2|
, and for every
plaintetxt/ciphertext Pip−1 , and every plaintetxt/ciphertext P
′
ip
, there exists a
unique key uipip−1 such that uipip−1(Pip−1 ) = P
′
ip
.
Thus we have to show that the fact that for every set of plaintetxt/ciphertext
(Pi ∈ Ei, ..., Pin−1 ∈ Ein−1), and every set of plaintext/ciphertext P
′
i2
∈ Ei2 , .., P
′
j ∈
Ej , there exists an unique set of keys ui2i, .., ujin−1 such that uipip−1(Pip−1 ) =
P ′ip implies that for every plaintetxt/ciphertext Pip−1 , and every plaintetxt/ciphertext
P ′ip , there exists a unique key uipip−1 such that uipip−1(Pip−1) = P
′
ip
which is
the second hypothesis of the Shannon theorem at every node. This is straight-
forward.
The entropy cocycle.
In this part we are going to study the entropy of data conveyed in a network.
Definition 2.
Let U be a random variable defined on the set {u1, ..., un}, we denote by pi
the probability of the event U = ui. The entropy H(U) = −
∑i=n
i=1 piLn(pi),
where Ln is the logarithm.
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Let V be another random variable defined on {v1, ..., vp}, we denote by p
′
i
the probability of the event V = vi. We denote by H(U | vj) = −
∑i=n
i=1 p(ui |
vj)Ln(ui | vj).
We denote by H(U | V ) =
∑i=p
i=1H(U | vi).
The entropy H(U) quantify the information given by the variable U , and
the relative entropy H(U | V ) quantifies the information given by the variable
U if we know already the information given by the variable V .
Proposition 2.
Let N be a network, Ui, and Uj users of N , we suppose that the keys are
defined by a gerbe C defined on N , let Vji the space of keys that Ui uses to send
messages to Uj, the entropy H(Vji) is a 1-Cech cocycle.
Proof.
Let Ui, Uj and Ul be users of N , we have to show that H(Vjl) − H(Vil) +
H(Vij) = 0. The set of keys Vil is the set of automorphisms between El → Ei
which can be viewed as composition of elements uij ◦ ujl. The probability
measure on Vil is thus the product of the probability measures of Vij and Vjl,
since we have assume that the choice of keys at each node are independent. Let
pij be the probability of uij , and pjl be the probability of ujl, the probability
of uij ◦ ujl is pijpjl. We deduce that
H(Vil) =
∑
uij∈Vij ,ujl∈Vjl
−pijpjlLn(pijpjl)
= −
∑
uij∈Vij ,ujl∈Vjl
pijpjl(Ln(pij) + Ln(pjl)
= (
∑
ujl∈Vjl
pjl)(−
∑
uij∈Vij
pijLn(pij) + (
∑
uij∈Vij
pij)(−
∑
ujl∈Vjl
pjlLn(pjl)
= H(Vij) +H(Vjl).
This implies the result.
The following result is well-known in the theory of information:
Theorem 2.
Consider a network, and users Ui and Uj of the network, we denote by Vji the
set of keys used by Ui to send messages to Uj, Pi the set of plaintetxt/ciphertext
used by Ui, and Pj the set of plaintext/ciphertext used by Uj, then H(Vji | Pj) =
H(Vji) +H(Pi)−H(Pj).
We can show the following result:
Proposition 3.
In a network, the quantity H(Vji | Pj) is a 1-Cech cocycle.
Proof.
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We have to show that for users Ui, Uj and Ul of N , H(Vlj | Pl) − H(Vli |
Pl) +H(Vji | Pj) = 0. We have:
H(Vlj | Pl)−H(Vli | Pl) +H(Vji | Pj) =
H(Vlj)+H(Pj)−H(Pl)− (H(Vli)+H(Pi)−H(Pl))+H(Vji)+H(Pi)−H(Pj)
= H(Vlj)−H(Vli) +H(Vji) = 0
Since we have shown that H(Vij) is a 1-Chain cocycle.
III. Higher non Abelian cohomology and End to End encryption.
Non commutative geometric cohomologies are needed in geometry to repre-
sent higher cohomological classes. These theories are also studied in theoretical
physics to interpret the action in string theory. The main difficulty to construct
such a theory is to define a theory of n-categories, the notion of 2-category has
been defined by Benabou, for n > 2, the coherence relations needed to define
such a theory increases considerably, there exists many attempts to define such
a theory, for example the thesis of Zouhair Tamsamani. We shall present now
the notion of non Abelian cohomology that we shall use to define end to end
encryption. This notion is presented in the paper [5], and does not use a the-
ory of n-category. The idea is to define recursively geometric representation of
cohomology classes. This theory can be viewed as the geometric representation
of the connecting morphism associated to an exact sequence of sheaves.
Definition 1.
A tower of torsors defined on the site C, is defined by a sequence of functors
Fn → Fn−1 → ...F0 → C, such that:
F0 → C is a torsor bounded by the sheaf L0,
The projection pi : Fi+1 → Fi is Cartesian,
There exists a sheaf Li defined on C such that for each object ei, Autpi−1(ei)(ei) =
Li(p0...pi−1(ei)), where Autpi−1(ei)(ei) is the group of automorphisms of ei,
which project to the identity map of pi(ei)
The classifying cocycle associated to a tower of torsors.
Suppose that the sheaf Li are commutative, we shall associate to each tower
of torsors Fn → Fn−1...F0 → C a cohomological cocycles (c1, ..., cn+1) defined
recursively:
We consider an object ei of F0Ui , and a map uij : e
j
i → e
i
j , the family of maps
(uij) define a 1-cocycle, which is the classifying cocycle of the torsor F0 → C.
Since the functor F1 → F0 is cartesian, we can find a map u
′
ij : e
′
j → e
′
i of
F1 whose projection to F0 is uij ,
Proposition 1.
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The family of maps uijl = u
′
jlu
′
il
−1
u′ij defined a 2-cocycle, that we denote c2.
The sequence F1 → F0 → C defines a gerbe over C whose band is L1, c2 is
the classifying cocycle of this gerbe, the family (c1, c2) is the classifying cocycle
of the tower of torsors F1 → F0 → C.
Supposed defined the classifying cocycle of the tower Fi → Fi−1 → ... →
F0 → C, it is a family of cocycles (c1, c2, ..., ci+1), where for 0 < l < i + 1, cl
is a l + 1- Ll-cocycle. We denote by ui1...ii+2 the chain which define the i + 1-
cocycle, it is an automorphism of the object ei1...ii+1 of Fi over Ui1...ii+1 , since
the map Fi+1 → Fi is cartesian, we can lift ui1..ii+2 to a map u
′
i1...ii+2
of the
object ei1...ii+2 of Fi+1, we suppose that ei1...ii+2 projects to the restriction of
ei1...ii+1 to Ui1...ii+2 .
Proposition 2.
the Cech boundary δ(u′i1...ii+2) = ui1...ii+3 is an i + 1-Li+1-Cech cocycle,
which is the classifying cocycle.
We denote by ci+2 the i+2-cocycle defined by the chain ui1...ii+3 , the family
of cocycles (c1, ..., ci+2) is the classifying cocycle of the tower Fi+1 → F0 → C.
Let U be an object of C, and eU an object of F0(U), we denote by fneU , the
fiber of eU , it is the n − 1 tower FneU → ...F1eU → eU , such that FieU is the
subcategory of Fi, whose objects project to eU . We endow eU with the topology
of U .
Let Ui and Uj be objects of C, and eUi and eUj two respective objects of
C0Ui and C0Uj , a map uij : e
i
j → e
j
i induces a morphism u
n
ij : fnej → fnejof
n− 1-tower of torsors between the fibers of ej and ei.
Example.
Let C be a site, consider a torsor F0 → C, and a family of exact sequences
1 → Li+1 → L
′
i+1 → Li → 1, 0 ≤ i < n. This sequence induces the following
tower of torsors: F1 is the category defined as follows: an object e
1
U of F1 is an
L′1 torsors defined over object U of C, such that the quotient of e
1
U by L1 is the
restriction of F0 to U .
Suppose defined the category Fi, i < n − 1, an object e
i+1
U of Fi+1 is an
L′i+1-torsors over object U of C such that its quotient by Li+1 is the restriction
of an object of Fi to U .
III.1. Encryption with a tower of torsors.
Definition 1.
Let C be a tower of torsors, and Fn → Fn−1 → ...F0 → C a tower of torsor
defined on C, we suppose that the objects of C are members of a network,
and for each object U of C, the objects of the category Fn which project to U
are isomorphic to an L′n+1 trivial torsor defined on U , where L
′
n+1 is a finite
(commutative) group that we identify to the alphabet used in the network. The
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encryption defined by the tower of torsors C, is the encryption such that the
exchange between Ui and Uj is defined by a map u
n
ji : e
n
j → e
n
i , where e
n
j and
eni are objects of F
n whose respective projection on C are Uj and Ui.
This protocol of encryption can be applied to the previous example of tower
of torsors. We have seen that in a network, the information is hierarchical, in
a network in which encryption is defined by a tower of n-torsors, the alphabet
is L′n+1 which can be viewed as a union of the alphabet L
′
i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The
information written with the alphabet L0 = L
′
0 is the header, which is encrypted
and decrypted at each node. We are going to see, that the most n is big, the
most it is difficult to break information conveyed in the tower of torsors. Thus
the natural order of the alphabet L′i define, an order of confidentiality on the
message.
Attack on encryption defined by a tower of torsors.
We have defined an attack for an encryption protocol by defined by a gerbe,
we shall generalize this attack to an encryption protocol defined by a tower
of torsors. We remark that an encryption defined by a tower of torsor is a
priori more secured than an encryption defined with a gerbe, since the relations
between the keys are more complicated in the tower of torsor than in the gerbe.
We suppose that we can define an attack for a tower of torsors Fn → Fn−1 →
F0 → C, using n + 2-intruders, this is equivalent to saying that given n + 2
intruders U1, ..., Un+2, and two users Ui and Uj of the network, we can define
attack which allow U1, ..., Un+2 to find the key u
n
ij .
let fn+1 = Fn+1 → Fn → ...F0 → C, be a tower of torsors which defines an
encryption scheme over the topos C, Suppose that there exists n+ 3 intruders
in the network, denoted by U1, ..., Un+3. We can construct the topos CU1 whose
final object is U1, and whose topology is generated by the covering family (Ui×C
U
1
), the restriction of F0 to CU1 is trivial, we can thus construct the tower of
torsors F ′n → ...F
′
0 → CU1 , where F
′
i is the fiber Fi+1U1 of Fi+1 over U1. This
sequence is an n-tower of torsors, its classifying cocycle can be constructed using
the restriction of the transition functions ulp of F0 → C to CU1 , the recursive
hypothesis implies that the encryption protocol that it induces can be broken
with n + 2-intruders, since U1 ×C U2, ..., U1 ×C Un+3 are intruders, we deduce
that the encryption system can be broken.
The encryption protocol with n-tower of torsors gives rise to the following
problem: Let N be a network which users are U1, ..., Un, we suppose that the Ui
are objects of a topos, and they communicate with plaintexts written in a finite
alphabet which can be identified to an algebraic variety V over a finite field, we
suppose that the keys are elements of the group H of algebraic automorphisms
of V . Is there a tower of gerbe, or a notion of n-gerbe such that the keys are
defined using the previous protocol?
Proposition 1.
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Suppose that there exists an exact sequence 1 → H1 → H → H2 → 1 such
that uijujluli ∈ H1, then there exists a gerbe D → C such that the encryption
protocol associated to D defines the keys of the cryptosystem.
Proof.
The projection p : H → H2 induces a torsor P → C, whose trivialization
is defined by the transition function p(uij), the gerbe associated is the gerbe
defined by the extension problem of the exact sequence.
II.2. Public encryption and tower of torsors.
We shall define public encryption using tower of torsors, on this purpose we
need to define a notion of flat tower of torsors and connective structure on flat
tower of torsors.
Definition 1.
A connective structure defined on the tower of torsors Fn → Fn−1...F0 → C,
is a 0-chain of the sheaf L0.
This definition generalizes the corresponding definition for torsors and gerbes.
In practice as we have seen in the example defined above, the objects of Fi
are H ′i+1-torsors defined over an object of C. The map u
n
ij : e
i
j → e
j
i is induced
by a map of the trivial H ′n+1 torsor defined over Ui ×C Uj a connection can
defined as a family (ci)i∈I of elements of the Lie algebra H
′
n+1.
A public encryption is defined by a function L : Hn ×Hn → Hn such that
L(ci, exp(cj)) = u
n
ij
The private key of the user Ui is ci, its public key is exp(ci).
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